Africa’s Power Shift: China, Russia, and UAE Reshape Influence

Rocking the cradle.

The growing influence of China, Russia, and the UAE in African geopolitics reflects a broader realignment of global power, with each state pursuing distinct strategies that exploit the continent’s resources and strategic position.

Their approaches—centered on economic leverage, security arrangements, and trade infrastructure respectively—intersect in areas of mutual gain but diverge when competing interests surface, shaping a complex web of engagement across key African nations.

The United States, recognizing this shifting landscape, has recalibrated its own strategy in response, aiming to counterbalance these actors while advancing its interests in security, governance, and economic development.

China’s strategy hinges on economic penetration through the Belt and Road Initiative, prioritizing infrastructure to secure resource flows and integrate African economies into its global network. Railways in Ethiopia, ports in Djibouti, and roads in Angola serve as arteries for minerals like cobalt and oil, with repayment often structured through resource exports.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chinese firms dominate over 70% of cobalt mining operations, a resource that constitutes 60% of the global total according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), making the DRC pivotal for battery production worldwide. Angola has absorbed $20 billion in loans since 2000, largely tied to oil, where it holds 0.5% of global reserves per OPEC data, a modest but steady supply for China’s energy needs.

Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, valued at $4 billion, exemplifies the scale of these projects. A naval base in Djibouti, operational since 2017, underscores China’s interest in safeguarding these trade routes, though its military footprint remains secondary to economic goals.

Recent trends show a shift in China’s investment focus—while infrastructure loans peaked in the 2010s, there’s been a noticeable pivot since 2020 toward green energy and industrial projects, with $5.4 billion allocated to renewable energy in 2022 per the China Africa Research Initiative, targeting solar farms in Kenya and wind projects in South Africa.

Trade finance is also growing—China’s Export-Import Bank extended $3 billion in credit lines to African firms in 2023, aiming to boost manufacturing exports like textiles from Nigeria and electronics assembly in Ghana.

Russia adopts a more transactional approach, leveraging security cooperation to gain access to resources in unstable regions. Arms sales and private military entities like the Wagner Group serve as entry points, often in nations facing Western sanctions or internal conflict.

In the Central African Republic, Wagner has provided security since 2018, securing diamond and gold concessions—CAR holds an estimated 1% of global diamond reserves per USGS, a small but lucrative slice. Sudan yields an estimated $1 billion annually in gold through informal channels, tied to Russian military support, with its reserves at roughly 2% of the global total per World Gold Council estimates.

Mali has deepened ties since its 2021 coup, receiving arms and training in exchange for political alignment. Economic investment is limited—under $5 billion across the continent—but resource extraction remains the endgame, with minimal focus on long-term development.

Russia also eyes Zimbabwe’s platinum, which accounts for 10% of global reserves per USGS, and Namibia’s uranium, holding 7% of the world’s total per World Nuclear Association data, as potential targets for expansion.

Capital flows from Russia have seen a slight uptick in mining—Rosatom signed $300 million in uranium exploration deals in Namibia in 2022, while smaller firms have injected $200 million into Zimbabwe’s platinum sector since 2021. These investments often bypass formal banking channels, relying on barter arrangements or direct asset swaps to evade Western sanctions.

The UAE, however…