Could Iran's Regime Fall by 2029?
The current geopolitical conditions are ripe for regime change in Iran, and Israel may seize the opportunity in this fragile window.
While Israel has no official state policy of regime change in Iran, few policymakers would be averse to such an outcome. With the current state of affairs, Israeli strategists may capitalize on a rare confluence of three complementary forces.
The first is a socially fragile, economically exposed, and politically vulnerable Iran that has had the leadership of its proxies decapitated. Mossad has infiltrated the highest levels of the Iranian regime, and its populace are fed up with the state.
In other words, domestic instability✅
The second is Israel’s strategy and position. President Benjamin Netanyahu has spent a lot of the country’s political capital on the war which as led to severe backlash internationally. Maintaining the momentum of attacking Iran’s proxies will be less costly than to stop and resume at a later date. A ceasefire would allow Hezbollah to retreat, regroup, and then attack in the future, only Israel may have less political room to engage in warfare. To kill a hydra, you don’t cut off its head(s) - you stab it in the heart.
Strategic urgency with assets in place✅
Which brings us to the third point: President-Elect Donald Trump’s ascension to the White House. His administration is staffed with Iran hawks and are looking to impose a maximum pressure campaign similar to his first term. He is also a staunch supporter of Israel and their retaliatory military operations. While he is not looking for regime change as an official policy, his administration could provide the international support necessary for Israel.
Hegemonic support✅
We also have seen Netanyahu say the Iranian people will “soon be free” at the same time that the Exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi issued a statement saying he is ready to “lead a transitional government”.
As Research Analyst Janatan Sayeh from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told me: “With Washington and Jerusalem aligned on the Iranian challenge, a shared strategy can strike at the Islamic Republic's most vulnerable points: its fragile economy and simmering domestic dissent. By leveraging these weaknesses, the opportunity to reshape the regional balance and confront Tehran’s ambitions has never been more within reach.”
Consequently, considering all relevant factors and conditions, Pantheon Insights assesses that a regime change in Iran is more likely than not within the next four years. Here is a more in-depth assessment of conditions and tactics.
Leveraging Domestic Instability in Iran
Iran faces a trifecta of internal challenges: economic strain, widespread domestic unrest, and a populace increasingly alienated from the ruling elite.
As of October 2024, Iran's annual inflation rate was 34.5%, while the unemployment rate stood at around 7.5%. As of November 2024, the official exchange rate is approximately 42,000 Iranian rials (IRR) to 1 U.S. Dollar. However, in unofficial markets, the rate is significantly higher, reflecting the rial's diminished value.
Oil exports, the regime's economic backbone, have shown recovery but remain below pre-sanctions levels. As of November 2024, Iran's crude shipments averaged approximately 1.7 million barrels per day, a notable increase from 750,000 barrels per day in 2023, yet still short of the 2.5 million barrels per day recorded in 2017.
Economically, Iran’s reliance on oil exports, primarily to China, makes it vulnerable to external pressure. Chinese purchases accounted for over 80% of Iran’s crude exports in 2023, leaving Tehran exposed to disruptions. This is where hegemonic pressure from the U.S. may come into play.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) stranglehold on key industries ensures that any economic gains disproportionately benefit the regime rather than ordinary citizens.
Undermining the economic conduits of the IRGC is central to Israel’s strategy for crippling Iran. The terrorist group’s fragile hold on power rests largely on its dominance of the petroleum sector.
Consequently, targeted disruptions to oil infrastructure, as Israel has suggested, would significantly weaken the regime without dramatically affecting global energy markets. Limiting oil revenues would dent the IRGC’s funding channels used to carry out regional operations through its proxies.
The IRGC exports the revolution of Iran through the Quds force that funds proxies. When these escalations occur, there are very few instances of Iranian nationals dying; it is almost always proxies. This disconnect between IRGC, it’s proxies, and the Iranian people is central to Israel’s strategy.
Nonetheless, economic pressures have amplified hardship for ordinary citizens and will continue to do so, driving widespread resentment that manifests in increasingly frequent protests.
Large-scale demonstrations erupted in November 2019, triggered by fuel price hikes, resulting in a violent crackdown that killed an estimated 1,500 protesters.
This was one of the deadliest crackdowns in decades, far surpassing the Green Movement protests in 2009, which were initially sparked by allegations of electoral fraud. The 2009 protests, while significant, were concentrated in urban areas and lasted several months, whereas the 2019 unrest was nationwide and escalated rapidly within days.
In 2022, protests reignited following the death of Mahsa Amini, a young woman detained by the morality police, spreading to over 150 cities. Unlike previous protests, these included a broader demographic, with women and youth playing leading roles.
As of 2023, labor strikes and localized protests have persisted, often escalating into nationwide movements, such as the teachers’ strikes in January and oil workers’ walkouts in May.
The short intervals between uprisings—less than three years compared to the decade between the 2009 and 2019 protests—indicate mounting public frustration and the regime's eroding capacity to maintain control.
Unlike past uprisings in the Middle East where one authoritarian government was substituted for an extremist/Islamist opposition, the Iranian opposition is primarily secular. This is a critical distinction, as it reduces the risk of extremism taking hold in a post-regime environment.
However, the lack of organization and unifying leadership has limited the effectiveness of these movements. External support, such as providing Starlink to enable better coordination, could play a decisive role in transforming disjointed protests into a cohesive resistance.
Israeli Strategy
Israel is uniquely positioned to capitalize on Iran’s mounting vulnerabilities and advance its strategic objective of dismantling Tehran’s regional influence. Unlike in previous decades, Iran now sees Israel—not the United States—as its primary existential threat.
Recent Israeli campaigns, including the destruction of S-300 air defense systems, have not only neutralized critical infrastructure but sent a clear message: Iranian oil facilities, the regime’s economic lifeline, are vulnerable.
Israel’s military and intelligence operations have dismantled key Iranian assets without entangling itself in costly ground conflicts. Unlike the U.S.’s approach in Iraq, Israel avoids direct troop deployments, opting instead for calculated airstrikes, cyber operations, and targeted assassinations.
Mossad’s extensive infiltration of Iranian networks has facilitated these precision strikes, targeting IRGC commanders and proxy leaders while disrupting missile production facilities. Iran’s ballistic missile program, for instance, has been severely weakened, and production is unlikely to recover soon.
Israel also employs an entrapment strategy to provoke Iran into symbolic attacks on the Jewish State. These provocations allow the Jewish State to justify responses targeting key military and economic infrastructure of Iran and its proxies.
For example: In October 2024, Israel conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian military installations in Damascus, Syria. Days later, Iran retaliated by launching approximately 200 ballistic missiles at Israeli territory, significantly escalating the conflict.
Israel responded with "Operation Days of Repentance" on October 26, 2024. This campaign involved three waves of airstrikes on 20 critical sites in Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
The strikes destroyed missile production facilities, neutralized long-range surface-to-air missile systems, and eliminated detection radars. A nuclear weapons research facility in Parchin was also targeted, delivering a decisive blow to Iran’s strategic infrastructure.
Israel’s approach mirrors lessons learned from fragmented states like Iraq and Syria, where balkanization diminished adversaries’ power but produced unpredictable outcomes. In Iran’s case, Israel prioritizes fragmentation over regime replacement, as a fractured Iran would be less capable of projecting regional power.
Covert support from Gulf states, such as intelligence sharing and logistical coordination, bolsters Israel’s position. Saudi Arabia, for example, quietly supports efforts to weaken Iran but remains wary of empowering a secular Iranian opposition that might align too closely with Western interests.
There is also a sense of urgency in maintaining the momentum of Israeli’s war with Iran and its proxies. Despite the recent ceasefire achieved in Lebanon, this marks more of a respite than a conclusive end to the conflict.
What is more likely than not to happen is another flare up at a future date when the terrorist group and political party has had a chance to regroup. In the future, Israel will also have less political wiggle room to carry out its strikes and military operations.
Its response to Hamas and escalated conflict with Iran and Hezbollah has required Israel to spend a lot of its international political capital. The International Court of Human Rights (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for Netanyanhu and his former defense minister Yoav Gallant.
This marked the first time a sitting Israeli Prime Minister has been issued an arrest warrant. While this is more symbolic than anything else, it does indicate that future military operations will likely face ever more severe backlash and diplomatic constraints.
From a strategic perspective, maintaining the momentum and undermining the Iranian regime would be more strategic to do sooner rather than later. Furthermore, the next U.S. President, who is a strong supporter of Israel, will play a crucial role in the final input: hegemonic support.
Hegemonic Support
The Trump administration marked a clear departure from previous U.S. strategies toward Iran. The first clear break was the unilateral withdrawal from the multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
By withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Trump dismantled the framework that had been established under the Obama administration to curb Iran’s nuclear program.
This move, coupled with the re-imposition of stringent sanctions, severely strained Iran’s economy and placed significant pressure on its regime. The U.S. was no longer merely seeking diplomatic compliance; it was aiming for a fundamental shift in the power dynamics within the Iranian government.
The decision to exit the JCPOA and impose unilateral sanctions, in particular, sparked a backlash from European allies who had remained committed to the deal, but Trump’s approach was clear: the goal was to force Iran into a corner and potentially trigger regime change.
By withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Trump dismantled the framework that had been established under the Obama administration to curb Iran’s nuclear program.
This move, coupled with the re-imposition of stringent sanctions, severely strained Iran’s economy and placed significant pressure on its regime. The U.S. was no longer merely seeking diplomatic compliance; it was aiming for a fundamental shift in the power dynamics within the Iranian government.
Under Trump, Washington also initiated a novel framework towards Iran, particularly in its approach to foreign protest movements.
Traditionally, Washington had been cautious about directly supporting foreign dissent, fearing that such backing could delegitimize the protests and invite retaliation or destabilization.
However, under Trump, this taboo was broken. In his maximum pressure campaign, the administration not only designated the (IRGC) as a terrorist organization but also ordered the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force and a key architect of Iran’s regional strategy.
These actions—coupled with unilateral sanctions, and the active support of Iranian protesters—emboldened dissident groups within Iran, signaling U.S. support for those challenging the regime’s grip on power.
By backing these protests, the administration effectively discarded the conventional diplomatic hesitance around foreign support for internal movements, directly challenging the Iranian regime and making it a critical component of Washington’s broader geopolitical strategy.
The significance of this shift is not merely symbolic. By encouraging Iranian opposition through public statements and diplomatic channels, the U.S. sought to destabilize the regime from within.
This was a sharp contrast to previous U.S. administrations, which often viewed support for foreign protesters as a dangerous game that could backfire.
Under Trump, this risk was framed as an opportunity to weaken Tehran by exacerbating its internal contradictions and amplifying the voices of the disaffected. To compound the strategy, the U.S. also looked to deploy Starlink satellites to enable greater mobilization of protestors.
With Elon Musk now working as the de-facto right-hand man of Trump, his technologies may be leveraged in Iran as part of the broader strategy of internal destabilization.
Iran’s response to all of these measures has been multifaceted. Alongside the increased pace of its nuclear activities, Tehran is also resorting to unconventional means to exert its influence and circumvent sanctions.
The use of non-state actors—ranging from Mexican drug cartels to criminal networks in Azerbaijan and Canada—allowed Iran to continue its operations without directly confronting the international sanctions regime. These unconventional channels provided Iran with the flexibility to maintain its regional influence, despite the U.S.’s attempt to suffocate its economy.
Trump has also threatened to impose sanctions on Chinese firms importing Iranian oil as a means of further asphyxiating the IRGC’s economic lifeline. The President-Elect’s pick for national security advisor, Mike Waltz has stated he is looking to engage with China to reduce Iranian oil imports.
Israel’s actions align with its long-term objective of neutralizing the IRGC’s influence but occasionally diverge from U.S. preferences. While the United States seeks a stable and centralized Iran to avoid destabilizing the region further, Israel views fragmentation as a more manageable outcome.
Washington’s focus on Southeast Asia and broader strategic competition with China reduces its appetite for direct engagement in Iran, leaving Israel to act with greater autonomy.
With the incoming administration’s strategic alignment, precarious conditions in Tehran, Israel’s assets and sense of urgency, it appears that a regime change is more probable than not.