Turkey and Israel Clash Over Postwar Syria's Future

Mideast Ménage à War

As Syria emerges from over a decade of civil war, its fractured sovereignty has become a geopolitical canvas for regional power plays. Turkey and Israel, each with sharply diverging strategic imperatives, are deepening their military footprints across Syrian territory.

Ankara pursues a buffer against Kurdish militancy and projects influence through northern zones, while Jerusalem prioritizes curbing Iranian entrenchment through calibrated strikes.

Their competing visions for Syria’s postwar order are not merely parallel—they are increasingly adversarial. Though open conflict remains improbable, the risk of miscalculation or localized escalation is rising, tethered to the shifting balance of power in the Levant.

Despite current hostilities, Turkey and Israel are not natural enemies. In fact, Ankara was the first Muslim-majority country to formally recognize the State of Israel in March 1949, and for much of the Cold War, the two maintained a pragmatic partnership.

Strategic cooperation spanned diplomatic, economic, and military domains, with intelligence-sharing on Russian activities and coordinated efforts against Kurdish militants and jihadist networks. In a region defined by volatility, both Ankara and Jerusalem viewed each other as competitive yet indispensable stabilizers.

That calculus began to shift with Turkey’s formal endorsement of Palestinian self-determination in 1987, marking the start of a slow erosion in bilateral ties. Under President Erdoğan, relations further deteriorated, as Ankara adopted an increasingly populist and assertive regional posture.

The 2008–2009 Gaza war was a critical inflection point, but the rupture became irreparable following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. The Israeli raid on the Gaza-bound Turkish aid flotilla, which left nine Turkish nationals dead, triggered a collapse in diplomatic relations.

Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador, froze military cooperation, and Erdoğan escalated his rhetoric, branding Israel a "terrorist state" and equating Zionism with “a crime against humanity.” What began as a strategic alignment has since hardened into a bitter estrangement, shaped as much by domestic politics as by regional flashpoints.

In 2022, relations between Turkey and Israel appeared to enter a cautious thaw. Both governments announced the full restoration of diplomatic ties, signaling a pragmatic recalibration rather than a fundamental realignment.

Israel, perpetually navigating a hostile regional environment, welcomed the détente as a strategic hedge. For Ankara, the rapprochement reflected Erdoğan’s opportunistic balancing: tempering anti-Israel rhetoric at home while pursuing economic and energy interests abroad.

The two sides even entertained joint gas exploration projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, a move widely interpreted as Erdoğan’s bid to sideline rival Greece. Just weeks before the October 7 attacks, Erdoğan and Netanyahu met in New York, publicly committing to expanded trade, energy collaboration, and increased tourism.

But the momentum proved illusory. The Israel–Hamas war that erupted in 2023 shattered the fragile diplomatic scaffolding. Erdoğan swiftly pivoted back to confrontation, unleashing fierce rhetorical salvos while Ankara imposed economic penalties and openly aligned with South Africa’s genocide accusation against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

By March 2025, the rupture had grown unbridgeable: during an Eid al-Fitr prayer, Erdoğan called for the destruction of Israel, marking a new nadir in Turkish–Israeli relations and cementing the collapse of what had briefly looked like a strategic revival.

Divergent visions for Syria

The true inflection point in regional power dynamics came with the fall of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024. The collapse of Syria’s Ba’athist regime dismantled a longstanding axis of influence propped up by Russia and Iran.

In its place, a strategic void emerged—one that Turkey and Israel moved quickly to fill.

For both Ankara and Jerusalem, Assad’s departure marked not just the end of an era but the opening of a contest for postwar Syria’s orientation.

Ankara, having long backed former rebel leader and now-President Ahmed al-Sharaa, swiftly deepened its foothold. Erdoğan’s government cultivated close ties with the new transitional authority, securing both political and material dividends.

Turkish–Syrian trade has surged, and Ankara has successfully pushed for the integration of Kurdish militias into Syria’s restructured military apparatus. For Turkey, which has waged a years-long campaign against Kurdish forces in northern Syria, this development represents a strategic windfall.

The marginalization—if not outright dissolution—of Kurdish armed groups under the new regime removes what Ankara has long perceived as a persistent national security threat.

Israel, meanwhile, adopted a different playbook. With Assad gone, Netanyahu moved to preempt any threats that could emerge from Syria’s fractured landscape.

In late 2024, the Israeli Defense Forces launched a ground incursion into southwestern Syria, seizing several hundred square miles near the Golan Heights. This operation was paired with an expansive aerial campaign involving over 600 precision strikes targeting the remnants of Assad-era infrastructure.

Military depots, logistics hubs, and suspected chemical weapons caches were systematically dismantled. For Jerusalem, the objective was not occupation, but…